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ABSTRACT 
We explore in this paper the role of export subsidies when goods 
arriving from foreign countries are  initially of  unknown  quality to 
domestic consumers,  who  learn about their quality only  through 
consumption.  If,  when  confronted with such  goods, consumers view price 
as a signal  of quality,  a role for export subsidies can  arise.  In 
particular,  we  show  that absent  export subsidies, entry of high quality 
firms  may  be  blocked by  their inability to sell at prices reflecting 
their true quality.  Export subsidies enable  high quality  producers to 
begin exporting profitably even while unable to credibly convey their 
high quality to consumers in the  "introductory" period.  Thus,  in 
breaking the entry barrier for high quality firms, export subsidies can 
raise average quality in the merket and a welfare—improving role for 
export subsidies emerges.  Moreover, even when high quality firms find 
it possible to signal their high quality to consumers through an 
introductory pricing strategy,  a role for government  policy can arise: 
the signal  (low Introductory price)  represents a  transfer of surplus 
from foreign producers  to domestic consumers which,  as  we  show  below, 
can  be avoided with an appropriate export  tax/subsidy  polIcy, 
Robert W. Staiger  Kyle Bagwell 
Department of Economics  Department of Economics 
Stanford University  Northwestern University 
Stanford, CA  94305  Evanston, IL  60208 I.  Introduction 
Recent advances  in the theory  of international trade have  shed  new 
light on  the reasons for and effects of export subsidies.  One body of 
literature focuses on cross—market effects of export subsidies (see,  for 
example, Kemp, 1966, 1969:  Jones, 1967; Brecher and Feenstra, 1983: 
Feenstra, 1096:  and Itoh an  'iyoo,  1087).  These models share the 
characteristic that the subsidy—induced terms—of—trade loss in one 
market is offset by a terms—of—trade gain in another, raising the 
possibility of national benefit from a policy of export subsidization. 
Another body of literature,  as reviewed by Brander (1986),  has focused 
primarily on the role of export subsidies  as a means to 'enhance the 
strategic position of domestic firms engaged in competition for world 
markets with foreign rivals" (p.  26).  This  'profit—shifting"  motive has 
been the  subject of a large number of recent articles. 
We explore in this pacer a different motive for export subsidies, 
based on the notion that goods arriving from foreign countries may 
initially be of unknown quality to domestic consumers, who learn about 
their quality only through consumption.  Nelson (1970)  refers to goods 
whose cuality can be known only after they have been  purchased as 
"experience goods."  Examples of such goods would typically include 
technologically sophisticated consumer products, consumer durables, and 
services that have an element of custom design.  If, when confronted 
with  such goods, consumers view price as a signal of quality, a role  for 
export subsidies can arise. The rotion that inforratlrne1  msyrre'ris provide a rationale for 
trade  policy has  been  addressed by  several ore  zious authors,Lt 
'onnenfeld, Weber,  and  Pen7icn (40p)  examIned  the welfare effetos o' 
minimum ouality  standards  on  imports which are  of  unknown  cicelity  to 
domestic consumers,  Payer (1984) exrlcred the  possibility of beneficis' 
export  sobsidies in the presence of initially uniformed concuners, but 
did so wihout  ocdelina  exrlioitly the  ccoess of  consumer  i'amninz sod 
oxpeotatiorm formation,  A  oeoer  whose  rethodolor: is  more  oIosel 
related to our own  i5  that of  Grossman  and  Porn  (1986),  Tho  explore  the 
-ossibllitv  that  infant—industry protection rgt be  welfare-4rprovinm 
in a  merket for experience  moods  served  initially by  established foreimn 
suppliers.  while  theirs  is a  model  of both eiverse selection and  moral 
hamard,  (temporary) protection is  shown  to be tnlface—wcraening, as it 
leaves unaffected  the problem of  moral  hamard  and exacerbates  the 
problem  of adverse  meleoticn,  The latter effect rocurs  in their model 
because protection simply  allows  lcwertbaneverage cualit  firms to 
enter,  reducing the avenge ouality  of orcdvoticn  in  the  cerket, and 
hence welfare. 
in contrast,  our  model  explores  a situation in which,  absent 
export subsidies,  entry of high quality  firms ray be blooked  by their 
inability to sell at prices refleoting  their tnie auality:  export 
subsidies enable hIgh quality producers to begin exporting  profitably 
even  while unable to credibly convey  their high  quality  to  consumers  in 
the  "Introductory"  period.  Thus,  in breaking  the entry barrier  for high 
quality  firms, export  subsidies can  raise average cuality in  the rarket —3— 
and a welfare—improving role for export subsidies ernerges.!  Moreover, 
even when high qi.iality  firms find it possible to signal their high 
quality to consumers through an introductory pricing strategy,  a role 
for government policy can arise:  the  signal (low introductory price) 
represents a transfer of surplus from foreign producers to domestic 
consumers which, as we show below, can be avoided with an appropriate 
export tax/subsidy policy. 
Tn one respect, the role played by export subsidies in the 
presence of uninformed consumers bears a fundamental resemblance to the 
profit—shifting motive noted above:  in each case, export subsidies 
allow firma to precommit to actions that would be incredible  absent the 
government intervention.  In another respect, however, the  two policies 
are quite different:  while profit—shifting (end terms—of—trade 
shiftins) subsidies are beggar—thy—neighbor policies, the export 
subsidies explored in this paper are oareto improving.  As such, the 
implications that emerge for an appropriate domestic policy response to 
export subsidies differ merkedly from those of the  crofit—shifting  and 
terms—of—trade shifting models. 
After developing the basic model in section II,  we consider the 
effect of export subsidies in section III.  were we establish a welfare 
enhancing role for export subsidies both when a high quality exporter 
can distinguish itself from  a low auality firm through its pricing 
strategy and when it can not.  Section IV considers several extensions 
of the basic model, including the  introduction of a correlation  between 
product qualities of the exporting country, and the possibility of a policy response by the  government of the  importing country.  Section V 
oonoludes. 
IL  The Model 
Basic Assumptions 
There are  two  oountres  n the model,  the  foreign  country and  the 
domestic country,  When  a  distinction is necessary  foreire  country 
verables will be denoted by  an asterisk (*),  We  focus first on  the 
efforts of  a  single foreign firm to exoort  its  croduot to the domestic 
country.  For  simrlioity  the  foreign firm is assumed not  to  supply 
oonsur!ers  in the  foreign  country,  "7or  do any dorestio suppliers of  the 
good exist  In addition,  we  assume that  there  is  only a  single 
-  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  prtentie ouyer  of  toe firm  a  product ln toe  oonestlo  oountry,— 
The  foreign firm  has a  two—period  life,  The  first period of the 
firm's  life is its "introductory" phase,  while  the  second  period 
corresponds to a  "mature"  chase,  The  latter  phaee  can  be  thoueht  of as 
capturing  the  dsoountsd profits of a  possibly  infinite future,  The 
firm produces a  product  whose  cuality  is either "high" or "low,"  where 
the  firm's quality is determfned exogenously  at the  beginning of  its 
life according to a  commonly  known probability distribution, 
Accordingly, we define a quality index  p  as: 
I  i  ouelity is 
q =  L  if quality  is  low 
end  the probability that  the  good  is high cuality as  5 Pooh  (q=H). —5-. 
It is perhaps easiest th irrine the  firm engaging  in an 
effort  which rrv oroduce  a high cuality  good  (with probability 
or ny  generate a "dud."!  The important point is that  auality is 
not itself a choice variable——this is a model of adverse selection, not 
moral hazard. 
We assume that the product is an experience good:  while the 
consumers rap learn puality :erfecly after purchase, the cuality of the 
product cannot be determined by inspection (see Nelson,  1970).  The 
domestic consumer thus does not know the quality of the foreign firm's 
product as  its  introductory phase begins.  He may,  however, be able to 
infer ito ouality type from observed introductory pricing behavior, a 
point we take up below.1  In each period,  the  consumer chooses either to 
buy one unit of the  product or not to buy it at all.  With  ii()  and 
"(q)  defined  respectively, as the utility of consuming one unit of a 
good of puality  c€(t,W}  nd  Its unit cost o  production, we assume 
that 
u(H) > 0(H) > 0(L) > u(L) = 0. 
Thus,  high quality production is relatively costly, the  high cuality 
good is worth its cost, and tbe  low quality good is not:  the product 
either "works" or it doesn't.L' 
We assume that each foreign government has at its disposal a non 
distortionary means of redistributing income among its citizens, so that 
policies which increase (real) national income will increase national 
welfare.  We also assume that trade intervention is fully observed by al:.  olayers  to  the  game.  Note that we  do rot assure  to"  existc'nre  of 
rarital rket imperfeotions:  thus, toe role for  2r±sr-zention desoribeb 
below  does not depend on borrowing oorstrairts o" sow kind, 
Oinallv, it is oonvenfent hous'n  inessen4al  to ehstraot trot 
aggregate unoertainty.  To  do  this.  we  oonsider  reoliostins the  single 
flrm—oonsumer  set ur desorbed above,  and  define a  rarket es a 
rollention  of  Frmny  nob  firo—oorsuser oairs,  °arh  rair  in  toe rrkst is 
oompletelv isolated  from even  other rair in every relevant m"nse  end 
ouali"y realzationa are  unrelated  eoross  firms,  Otis  allows  us  to 
Interpret d  both as  the jjohabilifl that any  sirgle  firn in  the 
raret will  be  igh ouali"y,  and as  the pronortion  of  "irma  in  the 
oarket  that are  high ouality.  Sinoe all  firm—"onsumer mairs  are  ax—ante 
identioal,  and  sinoe all  firms  of a oualty  ta'oe are dentioal ex—post, 
we will  use  'the firm" and  "the  oonsumer" to refer to a  reoresentetise 
firm  tpossibly of  type q)  and  a representative oorsuoer  in  the  inreet, 
The  Order of Moves 
We  ignore  government polioy  for the  moment and  desorbe  the  same 
between the  foreisa  firm and  the domestfo  oonsumer.  The introduotory 
phase  for the  foreign firm starts with the  realization of its ouality 
type:  onoe determined, the game begins.  The foreign firm moves first, 
ohoosing its introduotory prioe  P1  knowing its  quality type,  Next, 
observing  P but not  the  realization o'  q,  the domestio oonsumer 
-I- 
forms  a belief about the  cuality of the  foreign mroduot and ohooses 
whether or not to buy. —7- 
The me  advances to the  nuture phase only if a  sale was  wede 
during the introductory phase.!  In this case,  the  domestic consumer has 
experience with the foreign product from his introductory phase 
consumption, and the  quality of  the product is known to him.  The 
foreign firm chooses its nature phase price  P  aware that the domestic 
consumer  knows the cuality of its product.  Finally, knowing  q  and 
observing  P  ,  the  domesti consumer chooses whether  or not to  make  a 
repeat purchase of  the  foreign  good. 
The  Equilibrium Concept 
We  now  croceed  to define  informally  a  sepuential  equilibrium 
(reps and Wilson, 1982) for the  game.  sequential equilibrium  is a 
coupling  of strategies and beliefs such that i) every player moves 
optImally at every information set given his beliefs and the equilibrium 
strategies of other olayers, and 2) at every information set reached on 
the equilibrium path, beliefs agree with Bayes' rule. 
Some further notation will prove helpful.  Let 
P1(H) 
and  P(L) 
be the respective introductory prices of a high and low cuality firm. 
Let 
b1(P1) 
be a consumer's introductory phase belief function: 
bI(PT) 
gives the probability with which the  domestic consumer believes 
a foreign firm charging an introductory price  P1 
to be high quality. 
Seoaration  is said to occur in the introductory phase if 
P1(H) 4 P(L).  In this  case,  the consumer can infer quality exactly 
after  seeing the introductory price.  To put the point differently, when 
p(H)  4 P(L),  Bayes' rule requires  b1(P(H)) 
= 1  and 
b1(P1(L)) 
= 0.  When  P1(H)  =  P1(L)  P1,  2ing  occurs in the —p— 
introductory phase,  Price reveals no information in this case,  Seliefs 
must then be such that  b1(P) 
equals the appropriate prior on high 
quality.  As we  consider  only pure strategies, any  sequenttel 
ecuilibrium wIll have  either seoaraton  or oooling fn the Introductory 
phase, 
Notice that  the  secuentlal equilibrium  ronoent imposes  no 
restrictions on  beliefs off  the eouilibriam r!eth:  that is,  if 
*  *  *  * 
Pt  (P1(H), P1(L))  is announced, then  hJP)  is unreetriotect 
(Payee'  rule ran not apply to zero orobability eventej  The 
speoifi oetion  of dseouilibrium beliefs  is nevertheless important 
These  beliefs determine  the consumer's response to a deviant price  end 
therefore determine the firm's  incentive to  oherse a dieequilibrum 
price,  The freedom whiob the seouential equilibrium concept affords in 
the soeoifioation of disequilibrium beliefs generally leede to a 
multlplioity of equilibria,  However, certain belief moruotures are  rcre 
plausible than others,  end.  in the remainder of this section we  deeoribe 
a  refinement of the sequential eouilibrium  concert which  leads  us  to 
focus  on  particular equilzhrte. 
To  this end, consIder the  mature  phase of the me,  supposing that 
the domestic consumer tried the  product in the  introduotory phase, 
Sequential equi'ibrium then requires that  5(H) = TJ(H),  5(L) > 0,  and 
that the oonsuser buy in the mature obese if and only If  o = N,  The 
oonsumer therefore gets zero utility in the (complete information) 
mature phase, whether  q = H  or  ha  RealIzing that his future utility 
is always zero,  a consumer has no  "experlsental" incentive in the —9— 
introductory phase  to  try  the  product in order to acquire 
information.i.2! A  rational consumer therefore maximizes instantaneous 
expected  utility in each reriod. 
Suppose then that a price  P1 
Is observed in the  introductory 
phase.  The consumer buys if  f  his  instantaneous expected utility from 
doing so is positive, or 
(u(H)  - P1)  + 
(1-b1(P1)(O-°1) 
> o  (2) 
that is, a purchase occurs 1ff 
b1(P1) u(H)  > 
P;.  (3) 
Given  U(H),  the line plotted in Firure I  provIdes beliefs about 
puali that would satisfy (3) with epuali  for  o1E[c,(H)1. 
TOW 
suppose also that pooling occurs,  so that  b(P1) 
=  Then  using 
(3),  the consumer buys in a pooling equilibrium 1ff 
<  () 
e argue  now that,  if the  foreign firm is in a pooling epuilibrium 
in which it makes an introductory phase sale,  then 
() 
is the "most reasonable" specification for the pooling price.  To see 
why, suppose for the  moment that  p1  is the eauilibrium pooling price 
where 
p1 = p() = 
P1(L) <p  (6) —Ic-- 
as  iilus4sated in i  rome 1,  Then it  be tha  w  = 
0  d 
have  toe  following cbe"tion in such  sri  uolihrium.  ber this 
ecuilibriur o bold,  it must  be  that 
b(P_)  < 0,  = bJP 
'  r  o 
rtne4fsa,  roTh  firm  types wona  decisme  to  p  -nd in"ese profits 
with  the  cipher  prbee.  With  r  by  "cucThicn,  onbe  sabes 
sense  if II e  "onsumer be] ievs  that  toe  ow  quality firm is relatIvely 
likely  to oberse  the  deviant  price  P,  Yet  each  flrr  type  has en 
—a  rnoene 4o  deviate ua  P  ito  Che  consumer decides  to b Jy at  moat 
once, 
The  "reasonable  belief would thus  seem  to  ha  b:(P;)= I,  Pu 
a  pooling eouilbrium at  P  <  P  can  riot en rt whnn  b  (P'  =  A -  and  I  Ii  H 
so  a coolins eouilibrius at price  P  can  be  "cruel  "unreasonable,"  A 
releted  aromemt suggestm  That equilibria In shron ri"  'rade "cours  'as 
'-a 
would  be  The  se,  for axemole, if  P  >  P1  are rIco  nreescr'bie 
provided that both firm  types  could  make  proitive r-e profits with  the 
-*  ii/  deviant once  P., — 
The  above  discussIon  suggests  the  following restrictions:  1',  If 
=  P1(L) 
and a sale occurs In the  introductory  chase,  then the 
introductory  pooling price must be  and 2) If both firm pes  could 
make positive same profits at the  introductory price  P1,  then an 
Introductory phase sale must occur.  In what follows, we safer to an 
22ibri  as  a  sequential equilibrium  satIsfying  the  above 
12/  restrictIcns.— —11— 
We employ these restrictions because they impart  a standard of 
plausibility and because they simolify the exoosition of the ensuing 
analysis.  We note,  however, that our results are not fundamentally 
dependent upon the  proposed restrictions. 
ITT.  The Pole of rxoort Subsidies 
In this section, we establish three basic results.  First, in the 
absence of export subsidies, high quality firms may be unable to find 
buyers In the domestic market.  Incomplete information about quality can 
therefore act as a barrier to welfare ImprovIng exports.  Moreover,  this 
barrier emerges even though fixed costs of production and competition 
from incumbent producers in the  domestic country are absent  the high 
quality firms are unsuccessful because they cannot distinguish 
themselves from low quality firms.  Second, with no private information 
about firm quality but with the ability to precommit to a tax/subsidy 
program over the  two—period life of the  firm, the  foreign government can 
increase foreign welfare by undertaking an export tax/subsidy program 
which supports a separating equilibrium with only high quality firms 
exporting.  Thus, as in the  rent—shifting export subsidy literature, the 
ability of governments to precommit where firms are unable to do so can 
provide a rationale for government intervention.  Third, even in the 
absence of the ability to precommit to 8 two—period  policy, the  foreign 
government may be able to raise foreign welfare from its no—export level 
(and leave domestic welfare unchanged) with an export subsidy in the —12— 
introductory phase that supports a  pooling  equilibrium in which first 
period exports take place. 
ortrrers 
We hegn by asking under what conditions a high cuality firm will 
find it impossible to export profitably to the  domestic market.  Theorem 
I  provides the answer. 
Theorem  1:  In the absence of subsidies, fcreiry firms will he urahle to 
export to the domestic market, regardless of ouality type,  if 
u(.)  c(s)]  +  ciU(H)  c(p)] <  a 
and 
- 
dqP(P)  >  c().  (9) 
Proofl  To prove this we show that under the  conditions of the theorem, 
a pooliog equilibrium in which sales  take  place  would  lead  to  negative 
profits for a high cuality firm,  and that a separating equlibrius with 
sales also implies negstve profits.  Thus,  the  only possblity 
resaining is an equilibrium  in which sales do not take place. 





and  an  introductory  sale 





ÔHU(H)  and,  if the  firm is high quality, 
= UCH).  Put the  first ccndltion of the  thecrem then implies that 
the present value of same profits for a high ouality firm are 
negative.  This is contradictory. —13— 
Suppose  then that 
P1(H) 
* P1(L). 
Then the  low quality firm is 
revealed and rrkes no  sales.  Thus, to rake  sales and orevent mimicry, 
P(H) 
< C(L)  is required.  But according to the second condition of the 
theorem, this implies that  P(H)  <  and hence,  also leads to 
negative game profits  for a high quality firm.  This too is 
contradictory. 
Thus, the  only  rossility  left is  that no  sales take 
place. 
To sell a new product, an investment in information diffusion must 
be incurred.  This investment is really  a low price  which insures the 
consumer aRainmt  the  possibility of low cuality.  Peparation corresponds 
to full insurance; cooling is a form of  nartial insurance.  The first 
condition of Theorem  1  simply  establishes conditions under which the 
cost of partially insuring the consumer in the  introductory phase 
exceeds the  future profits that come  from  the diffusion of product 
ouality information.  The second condition ensures that orovidirig full 
insurance is no less costly. 
The conditions of Theorem 1  are more likely to be satisfied the 
higher the  discount rate in the forei country, the  lower the 
probability that hizh  quality production  will result from the foreign 
R&D effort, the  smaller the  social surplus associated with the  hfgh 
quality sood,  and the lower the unit cost  of producing the low ouality 
product.  These conditions suggest that such  informational barriers to 
exporting would be most likely to arise in the new—product sectors of 
low—income countries with no recutation for high cuality production and —if— 
relatively unproven technological capabilities,  In any case, when these 
conditions are satisfied, a role for  "infant industry" export subsidies 
may arise.  We now explore this role. 
The Role of Suhsdies 
The notion that a governsent program of export subsidies can  raise 
national welfare has been discussed in the  context of oligopolisto  firm 
interaotion by  Spenoer and Rrander (1953)  and Prander and Spenoer 
(1955),  The fundamental  insieht  of theae  oaoers  i5 that a  eovernment 
ray take actions which allow  firms to commit  to  irarkat behavior whfoh 
they could not credibly pursue in its absenoe.  In  changing  the nature 
of the strategio  fnteraotlon betiaen domestio  and  foreign firms, 
government  intervention can  shift  rents sway  from the rest of the  world 
and  toward  the  firms of the intervening oountry. 
Commitment  plays a crucial role in the welfare effeots of export 
subadies in the present model as well,  To isolate this role, we assume 
that the forefgn government  has no rrvate  inforratfon about  firm 
quality  in the  introductory ohase when  setting its exoort  subsidy 
program,  Thus,  only rature phase  subsidies can  be offered to  firms on  a 
quality  oontingent besis,  Nonetheless, f  the foreign government can 
preoommit  to a two—period export tax/subsidy program, then its ability 
to oommit where the firm can not nises  the  oossibility of welfare— 
enhanoing export subsidies in the  present model as well.  The following 
theorem summarizes this result, 
Theorem 2:  If the  foreign government can preoommit to a two—period 
export tax/subsidy program, then it can increase foreign national —15-. 
welfare over any no—intervention equilibrium with an export tax/subsidy 
program (, ) where  the introductory phase tax is  siven by 
= - (u(H)  - c(L))  <  0  (10) 
and  the mature phase subsidy  is given by 
—*  1_ 
S  =  rex  o,  —c(H)  - c(s))  —  1u(H)  ('()1f  }  >  0  (11) 
with  C >  0  and where  it Is understood that  S  is  to be paid in the 
mature phase only if the firm is observed to be high quality. 
°roof:  To prove Theorem 2, we first demonstrate that,  under this export 
tax/subsidy program, a separating eauiltbriunt  will obtain.  We then show 
that foreign welfare in a seoaratin  eauiljbriurn  under the tax/subsidy 
program is higher than under any equilibrium without government 
intervention. 
Suppose first that a pooling equilibrium arises in which sales 
take place.  Then  P(H) = P(L)  P1. 
If the firm is low quality and 
makes a sale, its profits in the  pooling eouilibrium, taking  account of 
the introductory government tax,  will be 
+  C(L)  =  (1-óH)u(H) 
< 0  (12) 
This is a contradiction.  Thus, in a pooling equilibrium, no sales would 
be made.  However, a hizh  quality firm can senarate and earn positive 
game profits under this tax/subsidy program.  In particular, with the 
tax  imposed by the foreign government in the introductory phase, an 
introductory price of 
?1(H) 
= U(H)  will not be mimicked by a low —16— 
quality firm,  since with the  tax  the  firm receives cnly  C(L.  tmhus,  a 
hish oualita firm can  make a sale in both periods at a nrice 
= p*(y)  = u(H),  and make gnme profits, inclusive of mature phase 
subsidy oayments, of 
*  _*  *  (D÷s  —c(R)+c[P(H)s  —C(H)j=cE>O  (13)  I  I  m'  m 
if  S  is strictly positive according to (ii),  and  larger  profits  when 
(11)  implies  S  =  0.  Thus,  the  tao—period export  suhady program will 
force  seperation. 
Finally,  welfare in the foreign country under this program is easy 
to comoute.  Under the assumptions of the model, the  export tax/subsidy 
payments are  simply  transfers  between the foreign government  and the 
foreign  firm,  and net out of the welfare oeIoulatons.  SInce no sales 
are made f the ffrm i5  low  quality,  and  since  the  foreign country 
captures all  the  social  surplus  if the  firm is high quality  and sales 
occur,  foreign welfare under the exoort subsidy program is 
w*(çC) 
= dHI(+a)(u(H) - 0(H))]. 
Absent the program, foreign welfare will depend on whether sales 
take plaoe  and, if so, whether a pooling or a sepesating equilibrIum 
prevails.  If in the absence of intervention sales do not take place, 
welfare is zero, and intervention clearly increases foreign welfare 
since  w*(s,g*) 
> 0.  In the  case of pooling with sales takIng 
place and no intervention, we have —17— 
:001cs;=o,  s*=o)  = 
oHr(oHU(H) 
- c(H))  + m((H)  - c(Rfll 
+ (1—ó  )Iou(H) — c(Lfl 
= w*(g*) - (1óq)C(L) 
* _*  _* 
w  (S  s  )  I' a 
'inally,  in the  case where ales take clace in a seoaratinz equilibrium 
with no intervention, 
W(S1 
= o,s  =  0)  = óuf(C(L) 
- c(H))  +  ((H) - f(Hfll 
= w*(,) - 
öq(U(H) 
- 
* _*  _*  (s  S  '  1'  a 
The impact of  the  policy outlined in Theorem 2 can be understood 
by examining the  role of each part of the tax/subsidy program.  'onsider 
first the  case in which, absent intervention, separation occurs.  Here 
only  high cuality exports will occur, implying that world surplus is 
maximized.  However, absent government intervention, the cost of the 
firms signal (its  low introductory price) acts to transfer social 
surplus from the foreign firm to domestic consumers.  The government 
program of Theorem  2 will in this  case consist only of an introductory 
tax on  exports  (*  will be zero)  which ensures that the  firm signals 
its quality  with its  introductory price, hut allows the  cost of the 
signal to become simply a  transfer  from the  foreign firm to the  foreirn 
government, rather than to domestic consumers..i￿.t'  Thus, the role of the —18— 
introductory  export tax is  to keep  the  signal  from :oomins a transfer 
to  foreigners.  The  mature  ohase  subsidy  S  will  be  strictly  rositive 
m 
whenever  conditions  are  such  that,  absent  the  subsidy,  a  high quality 
firm could not rake oositive  same  rrofits in a  seoarstng epuilibrium, 
Thus,  the role  of  the  anture  phase  subsidy  Sm  i5 simply  to  ensure 
positive  gnme  profits  for a  high  quality  firm in  the  separating 
eq u i I i b ri  um, 
Theorem  2  establishes a  rule  for escort subsidies when  the 
government  is ignorant of oualiç but finds polfoy commitment over the 
two period life of the  firm feasible.  Like the rent—shifting subsidy 
arsument, the ability of the government to preoommit is crucial.  Unlike 
the  rent—shifting subsidy, the  use  of exmort subsidies outlined in 
Theorem 2  leads  to a Pareto oreferred outcome:  it is not a bessar—thy- 
neighbor oolioy.7  However,  the  foreign government rey find commitments 
of this kind infeasible.  The next theorem establishes the  oossibility 
of a role for esmort subsidies when the government finds it in  possible 
to preoommit to a two—period program. 
Theorem  3:  Suppose the conditions of Theorem I hold and therefore that, 
in the absence of export subsidies, no exports will occur.  Suppose 
further that 
-  -  (1-6jc(L)  > 0  (15) 
so that the  social value of sales in the  nrket  is positive.  Then the 
imposition in the introductory phase of a striotly positive export 
subsidy  with 10 
—  — aftj(q)  —  . c 
where  C  ) '  wIll  raIse toretsn vel'sre ahove 'te no—subsidy case. 
Pfg  W±th tre contitlons  of  "eore ' tcldint,  C  w1l be strictly 
.4 
positive.  TMoreover,  _ wiU rçocrt .e  ;ooltnz e4Ltri.r n whLct 
sales  tate 1sce  ard  '."f) —  —  n  tris equilibrium, the 
high  qiali1y firm sees 
—  +  'a'Ut —  cOO, a  C  )  fj7) 
while the  low  ,uali'v 'Isp ces 
-0  •*  _*  t  .ft% _e)c>a  -a  S 
Finaly, without the  subsidy ales do not ta'e place  and  foreirn welfare 
is zero wite with  the subsidy,  foreir weltare 'roe market ssles is 
O0(3Qi(H) 
—  c(a)' + u(u(M) — rut))1 + 
1—off)roffJL) 
— c'ti) 
which reduces to the lefthand side of (15).  Thus,  the condition  of the 
theorem ensures that the export subsidy will increase the welfare of the 
foreign country above the no-subsidy case.  QJ.D. 
The nature of the government's welfare  enMnoing role can in this 
case again be  interpreted as taking actions dhich cable the firm to —20— 
commit  to behavior to which it would be unable to commit without the 
suhsidy.  In oarticular if,  before the realization of its auality type, 
the firm could commit to sell its oroduct at the introductory nooling 
price  regardless of its cuelity realimation, it would do so when 
the condition of Theorem 3 is met,  since the  condition ensures that the 
ex—ante profits of the  firm are oositive,  With this commitment, the 
domestic consumer would buy at the pooling price  P,  and fcrei 
welfare from market sales (measured  by market producer surplus) wo'uld he 
positive,  It is the  firm's inability to follow through on such a 
commitment once quality is revealed to it —— a  high quality firm would 
choose not to oroduce —— that explains the ent  harrier that arises 
absent export subsidies under the  condition of Theorem 3,  And  the 
exoort subsidy program, put in olace by a government unaware of firm 
quality, simply provides a mechanism by which a commitment to 
introductor  phase sales at the price  P1,  remardless of quality, can 
be made.1_! 
IV,  Extensions 
Tn this section we extend the basic model of section II in several 
directions,  First we explore the role of export subsidies in the 
presence of several potential export goods when oualities are correlated 
across markets,  We then relax the assumption of a oassive domestic 
government, and consider its  response to the  ezport policies of the 
foreign country. 5orrelated Pualities 
Theorem 3 of the previous section established con  ons  under 
which,  with no knowledge of oroduc cualitv, the foreir wovernment can 
enhance  foreign welfare and leave  raffected  welfare of the domestic 
countrv trourh  an introductory  hase exoor* subsidy.  "his exoorr 
subsidy proarar has  ceculiar "fIt—by—night' property that the  foreian 
oouncv nics ace a ri  'mta-Ie r *'af  nortion or "ions  in  the  market 
which  turn  "u'  cc  ha of  low  uali'y,  That this is 'The  case can he see" 
by noting in  19) that  WF)  is composrd of two carts:  6  times  mba 
orofi  ts  of a  hish  o2ality  firm,  which is negative  by  re),  and  (1_lu) 
tines  the orofsts of a low caltv firm.  For  to ha posiive 
given (  ,  fly—by—nivom  rra nus crc  tide Ye forei country 4L" 
welfara  ean. 
In  interestins cuestion is  ccw  intemmarvpt  correlation to the 
cualiha o -s  courtrYs escort soods mivht a"fect his  "j—cy—nishb 
Incentive  to subs-Yze exoorts.  To consIder the  e"ects of :alitv 
correIa*n  on trese  results, tne  towel of section IT  ts extended to 
include a  second market, which we take to he an exact replica of l*e 
first market,  Moreover, we assume there  is now  4us4  a single firm in 
each market, so that  64 is interpreted simply as the  probability that a 
firm is hsh  quality:  this allows the  ouality realization in one narec-4 
to alter  the exoected welfare conseouenoes of sales in the other 
market,  We refer to these markets as market 1  and market 2, 
respectively, and to their firms as firm 1  and  firm 2. —22— 
Let  c  be the  event that firm  i (1',2)  has quality  g. 
Define  Prob(H1), d Prob(H21H1), 
and 
Prob(42!L1), 
Assume O  and  are each in the open interval  (0,1).  As firms 1 
and  2 are to be thought of as equivalent, we assume 
Proh(H2) 
= Prob(1).  'inally, we assume that firm l's cuality is 
positively correlated with firm 2's quality:  >  > ô, 
The  stamp  'Produced  Abroad"  can  therefore  be informative to a domestic 
consumer who has information  about other foreign products.  To explore 
this source of information, we assume that firm 2 can not export to 
market 2 until after firm l's introductory obese in market 1. 
The consumer in market 2 is 'communicatively linked" to the  market 
1  consumer:  The market 2 consumer learns  about the  introductory phase 
of play in market I,  Thus, while  is the prior which initializes 
the market 1 gnme,  the market 2 prior derends on the  first phase of 
market I  play.  If firm l's product is not tried, then the prior is 
derived- from the  belief which the market I  consumer holds after 
1*  7/ 
observing  S  and 
P1 
.  If instead firm l's product is tried and 
found to be high (low)  cuality, then the  market 2 prior is 
Intuitively, the  extended model is one  in which eaulvalent firms 
enter ecuivelent markets at different points in time.  This temooral 
asymmetry would e  irrelevant if qualities were uncorrelated.  However, 
since correlation is present, the initial consumer experience with firm 
2's product Is a function of previous consumer exoerlence with firm l'g 
product,  If firm l's product is known to have worked, then the  market 2 
consumer holds it more likely that firm 2's product works.  There is —23— 
this an informational or rerutational externality beteoen te otdarwise 
inerendent firms. 
Jnder  the  conditions of Theorem 3 an appropriate eort  subs:.lv 
was shown to be welfare imorovirig  in tee shsenoe of any ouality 
oorrelation between  exporting firms,  The ceston  that we now wish to 
as is,  lvn 4--at  consumer ''mg a?of cir 2's  cuslity will  be 
infl noe  z any  exoerienos cite firn  exoorts  in  market I,  hoes  5tore 
still xiot a  role for exrrrc snisi 'i-a r nartet  1?  The  answer  to 
given by  tne following  tneorer, 
henr—A:  Thr  rse ths*  the oondlttons  of  Tneorem  told for mar-'ets 
and  T,  and  ti-at toality is rossttvely oorgn'sted across marksts,  Then 
the foreign  government  can  raise  exoeotsd foreign welfare  over an'? 
eouilibriv: in whioh  C  te prmvihing  an infroduotory  exmort 
to 
suislhv in  arket  of  m  = 
Proof:  "ndr the  conditions of the  tneorem, f  the foreign governne 
did not to subsidize exports in market 1,  no market  exoorts woulo 
ocour, market 2 would be unaffected by tee  oresenoe of qualify 
correlation  with market 1, and a welfare enhanoins export subsidy oould 
then be provided to the market 2 firm,  Rut an alternative polioy of 
subsidizing market I  exoorts rather than market 2 exports would yield 
the same producer surplus at an earlier date,  and would thus welfare— 
dominate an export subsidy only to market 2.  'loraover,  the ootental 
still remains for additional welfare reins from a subsidy to the market 
2  firm.  If the market 1  firs was found to be high ouality, this will augment the  welfare from market 2  sales  since  ) ô. 
If the  market 
1  firm turned out to be low  quality, then  whether or not additional 
welfare mains can be had rpm sales in market 2 will depend on the size 
of  In any case, having subsudized  exports in nErket 1, an export 
suhsidy to market 2 could be offered if  or  (whichever is 
relevant) warrants market 2 intervention.  As such,  quality correlation 
does not undo the  case for exccrt subsidies in this 
model. 
Theorem 4 establishes that quali  correlation need not diminish a 
country's "fly—by-night" incentive to subsidize exports.  When the  firms 
in a ccunt' are unsuccessful in the exccrt market,  and when the 
underlying cerameters (preferences, cost functions, and  are not 
expected  to change in such a way as to make success in the  export market 
scre likely in the future, an export subsidy may be attractive, both 
because of the  fly-by—night surplus captured if the firms turn cut to be 
low quality, and because of the  reputoticnal benefits tc future 
exporters if the  firms turn cut to be high quality. 
Impcrtin  Cove  rnment  Response 
Thus far the  importing government has been completely ssive, 
taking no policy scticns n  response to the export subsidy program 
abroad,  An  imccrtant characteristic of this exoort subsidy is that it 
is ncnxplcitive:  the  importing  ccunt' is not harmed.  As such, 
unlike profit shifting and terms—cf—trade shifting subsidies, the 
appropriate response from the  importing government may well he a note of 
"Thanks."  Tcwever, it is possible that the  mncrt1ng gcvernment  be tempted to respond with more  than simply a note of tbanks  once 
exporters have  made  the intrcduotorr cnase  inveotnant  in  ortatcn 
disseminatoon,  the  importing country can set tariff colic; to extract 
the nature  chase  rents.  We  retura to  the single—market  (osny  firm) 
model  of neccion U and explore  tnis issue.  broughout,  we  assume the 
asic  a  malcy Inc r taa*,  with  tne °ori -i government  coving in 
the into  u'''rJ :h.no',  nroI' ovnrv  m only odlicy ections  occur 
in  toe  maurm  chama,  Pp mln" n'ode  That  - ton  governments  are unable to 
coomi  to  policy  actcons  acroca  rraces,  and  are concerned  only with  the 
welfare  of  treir respectove  "iThc'—s. 
nder  the ascot' ttocs  to  ccde  the  importing government 
octomal  tarif'  rescrnse, rrnvlhe  —e—atumnntace 15 arrivel,  is to 
inpose  a  "store c:ase  omport tariff  m  —  P)  wbcch  captures 
all  the '-urrtos  from  high  oumlity imp"rts  ccr  lomectic cItizens.  The 
announcnanh c  any  ocbcr maci f colby would not he '-redtole since, 
once  'he  'store  phase arrives,  c  will always to  c4'cser.  15  such, 
when  the  irpcrting gozernmenc can rescon-b freely in the  mature chase, 
all rents 1rom the  mature nh-ace  escort of high cuality goods will he 
captured by the  importing country.  'low  suppose that,  in the absence ci 
a mature phase rent—extracting thrif  'rnosed to the  country, 
ma 
introductory phase  excorts would  take place  at the  cooling once 
with  exoort  subsidy  levels set to  zero.  That is,  succose that 
—  0(H)  +  a(U(H) - 0(H))  >  0,  and  P  > fL)  (20) 
Suppose  also  that _0q 
< c(H),  (21) 
so that it is the  mature phase surplus that allows the high cuality firm 
to  export at a loss in the  introductory phase and still make positive 
game profits.  Then we have  the  following result. 
Theorem :  Under conditions (20) and  (21),  the inevitahiljt-  of the 
domestic countryts mature chase rent  extracting tariff  c  will induce 
the foreign government to enter into an introductory phase export 
subsidy program if 
- 0(H))  + (1á)* - 0(L))  >  (22) 
and will preempt exports from occuring at all if 
- 0(H))  ÷ (1ôH)(P 
- 0(L))  < o.  (23) 
Proof  With  extractinz all mature phase surplus and  < c(p) 
high quality firm would suffer game losses  at the cooling once 
<  0(H),  and thus no exports would occur absent a government 
subsidy.  The subsidy will be forthcoming if surplus from exports is 
positive (condition (22)) and will not be forthcoming if surplus is 
negative (condition (23)).  0,.fl. 
Under condition (22),  Theorem 5 implies that the  inevitability of 
future protection in response to successful imports——or in response to 
introductory "dumping"  < 0(H))  of hIgh qualIty goods-—induces an 
export subsidy program on the rt  of the exporting country:  the export 
subsidy program arises in this case solely in rsponme to anticipated —27- 
future import tariffs.  This result reverses the  causal losic hehind the 
question of how  best to respond to the export sJ'sldv or  1m f  otner 
countries and suggests an escalating relationship betgeer  "xoort 
subsfdies and "retaliatory' tari5s.  "nlrr oondi+fon  the  theorem 
implies bat  the  irezitabilitv or futurr rroteseor, oreenps exports 
from oco srring.  inoe  the  fnroni*fi + ive' tari5f  response wosld never be 
observe  1,  "nis sclt sorgeus  tmet  cc'ed tori" 'evels "nv  ;ield  a 
poor  reasnre  of 'e listorti cc  wooia  cith tre hilirv  to  :se t  em. 
'/.  fisrusson end  0onolusion 
We  bate  developed a  todd  illustratng a  role for subsidies Ahen 
prod.ot 'calitv is unknrn,  The  rcel is not  veneral,  but  its 
simplioit' oes anshlr t  xnlorsfln o a  new  rsnze p nosltlve and 
normative iwsues,  J ow  ncss 'r—fly the  rroustness tf our resulo, 
sod lnr  en on±a  f.trs reoearoh. 
Incomplete information  about prooct tai:ts is a dell  mown 
barrier to entry.  This  point  was '-st made  '  Fain  ''956),  following 
his study  of  twenty  industries.  More  rroently,  Th'malensee  (1982), 
Bagwell  fl985), and  Farrell  '10P5  have stablished the existence  of 
this barrier in a  vsriety  of nodels,  lur  theorem  .+o4ld  thus  seem  more 
general  than  the  specfal esourptons  employed. 
We  argue that subsidies can  overcome thIs barrier and  increase 
welfare.  The qualitative flator of tha erg'unenm  ices not appear to 
depend on  our  special cost and  demand  funotions.1,  A  more  interesting 
consideration is the  possibility of  many types and/or  quality choices. The model could incorporete  quality choice relatively easily if the 
probability of successful R&D,  oH, 
were to  be  modeled as a choice 
variable of the  firm.  For example, suppose that  is a function of 
observable inputs of resources by the exporting firm.  In this case, 
there  would exist an incentive to overinvest in R&D so as to raise 
and break the entry barrier,  The role of export subsidies would then be 
to achieve  the  socially arpropriate °T  exoenditure level in the 
exporting country, 
It is also intriguing to consider the role of subsidies when the 
importing  country has domestic  firms  in the relevant industry.  In such 
a model, the successful entry of a foreign firm can cause  a loss in 
domestic producer surplus, and  so the otil  colicy for an importing 
country becomes more complex. 
The model suggests a number of other extensions.  One wonders, for 
example, what would happen if rational consumers were unable to observe 
perfectly the subsidy choices of the  foreign government.  Another 
interesting  extension concerns the use of quotas and  VER's.  How do 
these polIcies affect the signallins game between firms and consumers? 
These and other related extensions would seem to be fruitful issues for 
future research. — 
Motes 
S  See,  for  example,  the articles in  Krugcan t°Ba,  the 
literature cited  therein. 
ror an ecrirfral  exrloratior  of fe Iroortance in  tevelorjn 
ountrfes of infonetonal barriers to extort, see  Se a Torre 
"r is 'asi is  in  the soiri of  the rals of  Greenwald art 
islilz 'or6. 
A 1-nrne'n  cc Is,  there rat xis  rer t  terticth  lomest1c  consure'-a  s Ions  as o:runitarn  Ic  roe tree  If foreign  rsrere care  soc/at,  octhins of  :sltstive  thportance  would 
ciange.  "orsu-'ers  in  toe  dooea'Io outry srI/or  the  forea-n 
goternoert itsel5 thgbt  boxes—c  he athe  to  ohCain nformaton 
aroth  the  firm's  ruorsos  In  tnr  005L rrvet, ar  4-his could be ar 
sdItIorel swnal o'  ooalthv. 
J  Througrot we iore ens  cost of &T.  Ccnsi ten tlon of  such  coats 
wa  1  a  rinasraIr  r"rt  war  the  cnlitors under whlcr 
exoro torriers woolf  arIse  srI  .rer wbi r goternment 
irtec entlon would be  Ieslree  tot wr iI leave unatfeoted  4he 
raljtstiye nstore of oar resolts,  :pe  (1986)  for  a motel 
of r'Huct  .sliiy n  wrIt5 the OV rrtoos is exolicitly totaled 
6/  -  , 
'a sagna s  ous.  at',  an te,rwl  '-'-  ,  tegwell and  Procter 
flroE),  °arrell (1toT, ant  0anev 'M15r) advertising signals 
poslit" in  Melson '4974)  art  irlstror art Pioctan '1904j:  both 
price art etvertsIng sisrial  ojalt4v to Mjlgcon' act noberes 
'19°6), 
The sssusotion that  "(s)  =  is  Iressential for our  results. 
This assumption simolfies the exposition of the  game but is rate 
without loss of generality. 
S  See  thnks  and  Sobel  (1985),  Cross'n  ant Perry (1966),  Kraps 
'1904),  "lgrom  ant Roberts ('98), ant  Okuno_rujiwan  ant 
Postlewaite (1987) for  more on seosential eouilbrlum refinements. 
lo/  —  nee  ,rossmen,  Kihlstrom, and TMirmen  (  P77)  for  more  on 
experimental  buying. —30— 
There  is a second, less forsl objection to the  p1 
equilibrium.  Popular intuition holds that high prices  go with 
high quality,  Put if pooling is to occur at  1,  then 
b1(P1) 
= 
6H  and, for all  P a 
(P1,P;), b1(P) 
< H  It st 
therefore be that higher  prices do not go with higher expectations 
about product quality.  Notice,  though that if  pooling occurs at 
B1, 
then  b1(P) 
can be strictly increasing in  P.  If we are 
to have a pooling equilibrium in which the  customer is supplied 
and higher prices go with higher beliefs about product quality, 
then the equllibriua pooling price rm.ist be 
Both of these restrictions are implications of the refinement 
suggested by 0rossn  and Perry (1986)  as well as the refinement 
proposed by Okuno—Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1987). 
Since  is zero in this case,  implementation of the policy does 
not require government precommitment to a second period policy. 
The one  case in which the program of Theorem 2 will be a beggar- 
thy—neighbor policy is when separation would have occurred without 
intervention,  Here the  program is simply a first oeriod export 
tax,  and involves no export subsidy. 
A different interpretation, suggested to us by Dani Rodrik, is 
that high  quality producers fail to internalize the  post1ve 
externality of their sales on the profits of low ouslity 
producers.  The export subsidy is then viewed as a way of 
internalizing this  externality. 
16/  —  Positive correlation is the natural assumption, though the 
statement of Theorem 4 holds for correlation of either sign. 
For  example, if the rrarket 1  consumer belives that he has learned 
nothing about the product quality from the  introductory phase, 
either directly or indirectly, then the rrrket 2 piror is A caveats  Beqell and Piordan 'i95)  have established conditions 
under which a high quality firs best slznals its cuality with a 
hIgh price.  Milgrcs and Roberts ('cg5)  have construred  a 
different sodel  in which  a  low  introductory price  e  best 
signal  of hign quality.  These opposing pradictIonc  es  fros 
different assumptIons on the nature of consumer coo  nicaticn an 
on the extent to which price can  capture all  relevant quality  inforcatoc.  or the  present paper,  the  lesson is that our 
preficion of l tntro1rtorv 7rcee is not robust  to sfl 
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